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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

COMMERCIAL SECURITY BANK, a
Utah banking corporation,
Plaintiff/Respondent,

Case No. 87007

vs.
MERRILL BEAN CHEVROLET,
a Delaware corporation,
Defendant/Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Respondent, Commercial Security Bank, filed a Complaint for
a declaratory relief in the District Court of Weber County dated
the 11th day of March, 1986, asking the Court to interpret the
meaning and effect of a Trust Deed Note, a Trust Deed, and a
Letter Agreement dated July 19, 1967. Respondent Bank sent
Interrogatories and then took the deposition of J. Merrill Bean,
who is appellant dealer's Chief Executive Officer and by
stipulation his deposition was published and made a part of the
record.

Respondent Bank then filed its Motion for Summary

Judgment which was heard by the Honorable David E. Roth, District
Judge, on the 2 2nd day of August, 1986.
After a Motion for Clarification, the Court entered the
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Judgment in favor of

-2the respondent Bank in the sum of $24,000.00 dated the 10th day
of December, 1986, and Notice of Appeal was filed January 8, 198 7.
The Docketing Statement was filed the 28th day of January, 1987,
and thereafter respondent filed a Motion for Summary Affirmance
and appellant filed a Motion for Summary Disposition and both
Motions were denied on the 25th day of February, 1987.
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS
The essential facts on which the Court relied were
stipulated by the parties:
(a) Commercial Security Bank (hereinafter sometimes
referred to as "Bank") began purchasing automobile contracts from
Merrill Bean Chevrolet (hereinafter sometimes referred to as
"Bean") under the terms of an agreement dated September 3, 1965
(Bean Dep. Exh. 1 ) . In the spring and summer of 1967 the parties
negotiated the interest rate that would be applicable to a
$400,000 loan to be used by Bean for construction of new
dealership buildings (Bean Dep. Exh. 19; Exh. 5). The final
agreement of the parties is set forth in the July 19, 1967 letter
containing the following provisions:

(Bean Dep. Exh. 5)

The Bank agrees that the interest rate will be reduced
to 6-1/2% in consideration of the maintenance by you of
your commercial checking account with the Bank and the
offering by you to its bank loan department of new and
used automobile and truck contracts which meet the
lending policy of said Bank...
Under date of August 3, 19 67, Bean executed a Trust Deed
Note providing for interest at 7% per annum secured by a Trust
Deed of even date.

(Dep. Exh. 6 amd 7)

-3(b) Approximately two years later the Bank changed its
lending policies and refused to purchase any new or used
automobile and truck contracts including those offered by Bean.
Bean then discovered that all other banks in the Ogden area had
the same policy as Commercial Security Bank and would buy its
automobile contracts only if Bean maintained its commercial
checking account at that Bank.

Bean felt that it could not stay

in business without a market for its contracts and therefore
withdrew its commercial checking account from this Bank and
placed it in another bank that purchased his automobile contracts.
Plaintiff Bank then notified Bean that the interest rate on its
real estate loan would increase from 6.5 to 7% as of January 1,
1970.

(Dep. Exh. 8)

Bean objected to the increased interest

rate and informed plaintiff that it would continue to pay
interest at 6.5% under an established amortization schedule and
when defendant completed its payments as originally determined
the Bank claimed an additional amount to be due and owing because
of the increase in interest rate now calculated to be
approximately $24,000 plus interest from the 2 2nd day of August,
1986, and these amounts are not in dispute.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
1.

The Court had to accept and base its opinion upon Bean's

Deposition testimony that all other banks in the area refused to
buy Bean's automobile paper unless its Commercial checking
account was also placed in that bank.

-42.

At the time the Letter Agreement was executed by Bean,

the parties had a track record of almost two years of buying and
selling dealer paper, during which time Bean had met the lending
policies of the Bank.

Bean was therefore justified in believing

that his automobile paper could qualify for the 6.5 interest rate
by simply continuing the course of dealing the parties had
already established.

The Bank's position that it could

unilaterally change its lending policy and refuse to buy Bean's
dealer paper thus increasing Bean's interest rate on the real
estate loan is untenable because the dealer agreement of
January 1, 1966 (Bean's Dep. Exh. 3) providing that the Bank was
not obligated to buy Bean's paper was modified when the Bank tied
Bean's commercial checking account, and the offering of dealer
contracts as a condition precedent to the 6.5 interest rate. By
refusing to accept any of Bean's dealer paper and giving Bean no
terms upon which his dealer paper could qualify with the Bank,
Bean was relieved of any obligation to leave its commercial
checking account at the respondent Bank as a condition precedent
to the 6.5 interest rate.
3.

The Bank's unilateral action made it impossible for Bean

to meet the conditions which qualified it for the 6.5% interest
rate and at the very least frustrated the very purposes for which
Bean agreed to offer its contracts to the Bank and place its
Commercial checking account with the Bank.
4.

The Bank Holding Company Act, while not directly

applicable does reflect the public policy of the country, and was

-5-

appellani: Bean cr o:'~-r

±^

dutomobi.

-

.LLacrs

..3 J 9 78

lu ^aaIiiy ior che 6.5% interest rate on the rea1 estate 1oan•
ARGUMENT
POINT I
SUMMARY JUDGMENT IS APPROPRIATE ONLY WHERE
THE FACTS AND ALL FAIR INFERENCES THEREFROM
INTERPRETED IN THE LIGHT MOST FAVORABLE TO
THE LOSING PARTY, PRESENT NO FACTUAL ISSUE
FOR A DETERMINATION.
an ::I Concl usI ons of Law and the Ji idgment
of

t

h - u^u

. :;ej;.lv i:o.;:;,e

,.: ^ .. •.

i .rew its cl leckiz ig

^ccn^nt froTT- tpe j i a n t i f f I^:»k b-^u-v^s- .-. * *s the only wav Boan

checkipc 2 : " T r r

Cv

, iraww: * wi

. L a-t)o>/.trjn

'jrr..ier tes:::iea •

" * ;he :>• L i» nri f f Bai^ v; ; - not in retaliation

hi*

aur.omooi l e p a p e r .
r

~: ""-'-

I, x lidi. ± liCf a

t •'-' '" ."••"'-

xo

CuciL

(Bean De.*. - .

*~ " ^

" C " '" *•

i'ldil'ili

"* ^ ' •

Dean

>\

"~ n e

t u u

~ ,,r^

f" --J " r"

iU

iiv/i-

* n ~f -o. >- ,:- *-j ,~*£*

in cm

,

.:•- ..
-~ ?* /"in";

„ .

paper with any bank unless he placed his commercial

*" n —'

"'.~" I * t ' S

.'.:•'

checKin^

accoi u: I t: wi t h si ich other bank because t hi s v. -« • f=ran * *rd cract i :e
for all of the banks.

Geneva Pipe Co. v. I

> .-? insurance • .-.,

714 P.2d 6 48 (Utah 1986); Beach v. University of Utah, et a l . ,
726 1 > 2d 41! 3 (I "1 i.l: I ] 986)

' ' . "

' '

"'"

"-

'

" ' ' •

-6-

POINT II
MERRILL BEAN CHEVROLET WAS ENTITLED TO RELY ON
THE COURSE OF DEALING BETWEEN THE PARTIES AND
THE LENDING POLICIES OF THE BANK THAT WERE THEN
IN EXISTENCE.
By substantial repetition the bank emphasizes the rights of
the parties regarding the sale and purchase of dealer paper are
governed only by the agreement dated January 1, 1966 signed by
the parties (Bean Dep. Exh. 2). However, the provisions of the
letter agreement of July 19, 19 67 (Bean Dep. Exh. 5, Par. 8) are
the most recent pronouncement of the parties1 intent, and modify
the Dealer Agreement (Exhibit 2) because the offering of
contracts in the letter is tied irrevocably to the maintenance of
the commercial checking account and the interest rate on the real
estate loan and Bean must offer contracts to the Bank to qualify
for 6.5% interest.

Our courts have constantly adhered to the

primary rule in interpreting a contract, to determine what the
parties intended by looking at the entire contract and all of its
parts in relation to each other, "giving an objective and
reasonable construction to the contract as a whole."

Sears v.

Riemersma, 655 P.2d 1105, 1108 (Utah 1982)
To qualify for the lower interest rate, Bean had to maintain
its commercial checking account at the Bank and in addition
thereto, offer automobile and truck contracts "which meet the
lending policy of said bank."

For approximately two years the

Bank had bought all of such contracts that met their lending
policies.

Bean could not qualify by just offering automobile and

-7truck contracts of any description.

The agreement is clear that

the contracts must meet the lending policies of the Bank.

Thus

the Bank is imposing upon Bean a standard with which the parties
were familiar for approximately two years prior thereto and the
parties continued to operate under that standard for
approximately two more years until the Bank withdrew from the
automobile market and refused to buy any more automobile paper
including Bean's. The conclusion of the trial court that the
Bank was entitled to withdraw from the market and discontinue the
purchase of dealer contracts completely emasculates the intent of
the parties. In Resource Management Co. v. Weston Ranch, 706
P.2d 1028 (Utah 1985) the Supreme Court again confirmed that "a
law generally imposes a duty to perform contractual obligations
in good faith."

In further refinement of that basic rule, the

Court went on to state at page 10 37:
Thus, an implied covenant of good faith forbids
arbitrary action by one party that disadvantages the
other. (Citations omitted) Accordingly, courts endeavor
to construe contracts so as not to grant one of the
parties an absolute and arbitrary right to terminate a
contract. (Citations omitted)
It was error for the trial court to conclude that the Trust
Deed Note, the Trust Deed, and the Letter Agreement of July 19,
1967 are the only documents to be considered in this integrated
transaction.

Obviously, the conduct of the parties and the

understanding of the Bank as reflected in their own letter (Bean
Dep. Exh. 12) reflect the intent and the purposes of the parties
at the time the other documents were executed.

I.M.A. Inc. v.

Rocky Mountain Airways, Inc., 713 P.2d 882 (Colo. 1985).

-8In Shaeffer v. Kelton, 619 P.2d 1226 (N.M. 1980) the Court
said at page 1229:
The primary objective in construing a contract is
not to label it with specific definitions or to look
at form above substance, but to ascertain and enforce
the intent of the parties as shown by the contents of
the instrument.
Where a written contract is ambiguous, uncertain or
otherwise unclear, ...the intent of the parties may
be ascertained by their language and conduct, the
objective sought to be accomplished and all of the
surrounding circumstances at the time the contract was
executed. (Citations omitted)
The phrase "which meet the lending policy of said bank"
strongly implies that the Bank will have a lending policy in
force at all times and it begs credulity to believe that Bean
negotiated otherwise.

The unspoken assumption was that, as in

the past, Bean would offer paper that met the lending policies of
the Bank but if the paper did qualify, the Bank would buy.
In Davis v. Professional Business Services, 712 P.2d 511
(Idaho 1985) the Court said at page 514:
In every contract there exist not only the express
promises set forth in the contract but all such implied
provisions as are necessary to effectuate the intention
of the parties, and as arise from the specific
circumstances under which the contract was made.
At Corbin on Contracts, §770, it is said:
...a contractor whose promissory duty is subject to a
condition precedent eliminates that condition if he
unjustly prevents its fulfilment [sic]. This is true even
though he has made no express promise that he will not
prevent such fulfilment [sic]... (emphasis added)
In a good many cases, however, the promissor's prevention
of the fulfilment [sic] of the condition is itself regarded
as breach of contract. The court finds that he has made
an implied promise not to prevent or make more difficult
the performance of the condition.

-9Otherwise, the Bank could reject Bean's paper by imposing
onerous requirements, and thus force Bean to a 7% interest rate
and it is not reasonable to believe that the parties negotiated
with that thought in mind.

The Bank's gain was the commercial

checking account (paying no interest at the time) and the
interest on deferred vehicle payments.

Bean was assured a market

for its automobile contracts and received a lower interest rate.
Bean negotiated with respect to the prevailing conditions based
on its experience with the Bank for the past two years. If the
trial Court's interpretation of the contract language and the
applicable law is correct, Bean was simply a puppet to be
manipulated and positioned as the Bank saw fit.

The Bank could

reject Bean's paper at any time and thus increase the interest
rate to 7% or alternativelyf the Bank could reject Bean's paper
in 1969 and force Bean to find another financer for its paper,
and continue with the 6.5 interest rate.

Then if the Bank

decided to enter the market again in 1976, it could once again
demand that Bean offer its automobile paper that met the lending
policies of the Bank or alternatively increase the interest rate
to 7%.

If the Bank's theory is correct, Bean could have offered

to the Bank two automobile contracts and two truck contracts per
year that met the lending policy of the Bank and maintained a
small commercial checking account at the Bank and qualified for
the 6.5 interest rate and such a result is equally absurd.

The

course of dealing between the parties and the reasonable
expectations based thereon were an essential but unspoken part of
the agreement.

-10In Kendall v. Ernest Pestana, Inc., 709 P.2d 837 (Cal. 1985)
the Court dealt with the refusal of a lessor to consent to
lessee's assignment of the lease.

Viewing the lease as a

contract, the Court quoted from Cohen v. Ratinoff (195 Cal. Rptr.
84) as follows at page 844:
...There has been an increasing recognition of an
emphasis on the duty of good faith and fair dealing
inherent in every contract... In every contract there
is an implied covenant that neither party shall do
anything which will have the effect of destroying or
injuring the right of the other party to receive the
fruits of the contract....
Bean had a right to expect that the Bank would buy its
qualified paper and that it would not have to meet the
requirements of other financers and the Bank had a right to
expect that Bean would negotiate the majority of its contracts so
that the paper would qualify under reasonable bank policies.
(Bean Dep. P. 73, L. 2-9)

Otherwise, the incentives the Bank

held out to Bean to place its business with the Bank become
absolutely meaningless.

In this connection, the BanK's argument

that 7% interest was a good rate for Bean is totally irrelevant.
The only question is, did the Bank's change of policy prevent
Bean from qualifying for the 6.5 interest rate which even the
plaintiff must admit is $24,000 better than 7%.
POINT III
UNDER PRINCIPALS OF EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL,
PLAINTIFF CANNOT DISGUISE THE NATURE OF
ITS CONDUCT AS NOT BEING "WILLFUL."
The Bank suggests that because Bean did not allege "malice"
or "willfullness" Bean cannot complain.

But willfullness does

-11not have to be an essential element in these cases. As Corbin
has pointed out, and at 28 Am. Jur. 2d Estoppel and Waiver, §41
at page 648, it is said:
It is not essential to the creation of an equitable
estoppel however that the parties sought to be estopped
should have had an actual intent to deceive, defraud,
or mislead. Nor is it essential that the
representation or conduct relied upon be motivated by
actual malice. An intention to influence the action of
the particular person claiming the estoppel is not
necessary in all cases. It is enough if there was a
holding out to all who might have occasion to act on
the existence of a certain state of facts which they
might assume to be true and upon which they might act.
And at §42, page 649, it is said:
Although willfullness is sometimes mentioned as an
element of equitable estoppel, the term "willfullness"
is to be considered in context, and is generally used
merely in respect to some or all of the elements of
knowledge of rights or facts, the intent to influence
the action of others, or intent to deceive.
These principals were applied in Kojro v. Sikorski, 267 A.2d
603 (Del. Super. 1970) where the Court said at page 607:
Nor is it essential to create an estoppel that the
parties sought to be estopped have had an actual intent
to deceive or mislead...unintentional conduct which
induces reliance of another to his detriment is
sufficient to create an estoppel...
POINT IV
THE UNILATERAL CHANGE IN THE BANK'S LENDING
POLICY MADE IT IMPOSSIBLE FOR BEAN TO QUALIFY
FOR THE 6.5 INTEREST RATE.
To keep Bean's commercial checking account, the Bank was
committed to a policy of purchasing his dealer paper regardless
of what the Bank's policy may have been with other dealers. In
Thornton v. Interstate Securities Co., 666 P.2d 370 (Wash. App.
1983) the Court quoting from Brown v. Ehlinger, 156 P. 544 (Wash.
1916) said at page 378:

-12Courts cannot set aside contracts because the performance of
them becomes more difficult or more expensive than when they
were entered into* If it were so, few contracts would
survive the seasons of depression that periodically recur in
the business world.
The basic rule is set forth in Restatement of Contracts
Second, §261 where it is said:
Where, after a contract is made, a party's performance is
made impracticable without his fault by the occurrence of
an event the nonoccurrence of which was a basic assumption
on which the contract was made, his duty to render that
performance is discharged unless the language or
circumstances indicate to the contrary.
In Holmgren v. Utah Idaho Sugar Co., 582 P.2d 856 (Utah
19 78) the Court said at page 861:
The doctrine of impossibility of performance is one by
which a party may be relieved of performing an
obligation under a contract where supervening events,
unforeseeable at the time the contract is made, render
performance of the contract impossible.
Further, in Ferris v. Jennings, 595 P.2d 857 (Utah 1979) the
Court said at page 859:
...One party to a contract cannot by willful act or
omission make it impossible or difficult for the other
to perform and then invoke the other's non-performance
as a defense.
In like manner, a party to a contract cannot make it
impossible for the other party to perform and then claim damages
for the nonperformance.

In Howard v. Nicholson, 556 S.W.2d 477

(Mo. App. 1977) the Court said at page 481:
The doctrine of impossibility of performance means if a
party by his contract, obligates himself to a
performance which is possible to be performed, he must
make it good unless his performance is rendered
impossible by an act of God, the law, or the other
party (emphasis added) (cases omitted).
Once the Bank terminated the purchase of any dealer

-13contracts, there was no way for Bean to qualify for the 6.5%
interest rate.

Even had he left his checking account at the Bank

ir

and had he been able to market his contracts elsewhere, under the
Bank's theory of the case, they could raise the interest rate,
and they could have required him at any future time to offer his
contracts to the Bank if the Bank re-entered the market to get
the 6.5 interest rate, which is exactly what the Bank did.

(Bean

Dep. Exh. 11 and 12)
POINT V
THE PURPOSE FOR WHICH DEFENDANT APPELLANT
ENTERED INTO THE LETTER AGREEMENT OF JULY 19,
1967, WAS TOTALLY FRUSTRATED BY THE ACT OF
PLAINTIFF/RESPONDENT.
The basic rules on frustration are set forth at Restatement
of Contracts Second, §266(1) and (2) where it is said:
Where at the time a contract is made a party's principal
purpose is frustrated without his fault by a fact of which
he has no reason to know and the nonexistence of which is a
basic assumption on which the contract is made no duty of
that party to render performance arises unless the language
or circumstances indicate to the contrary.
Where at the time a contract is made a party's performance
under it is impracticable without his fault because of a
fact of which he has no reason to know and the nonexistence
of which is a basic assumption on which the contract is
made, no duty to render that performance arises unless the
language or circumstances indicate the contrary.
The Utah Supreme Court has recognized the doctrine of
frustation of purpose in Castagno v. Church, 52 P.2d 1282 (Utah
1976) and in Bitzes v. Sunset Oaks Inc., 649 P.2d 66 (Utah 1982).
The Court said at page 1384:
The Courts have required a promissor seeking to excuse
himself from performance of his obligations to prove
that the risk of the frustrating event was not
reasonably foreseeable and that the value of counter

-14performance is totally or nearly totally destroyed,
for frustration is no defense if it was foreseeable or
controlable by the promisso>r, or if counter performance
remains valuable.
*$gT
And in Everett Plywood Corp. v. United States, 651 F.2d 723
(USCC 19 81) the Court said at page 7 28:
The frustration doctrine has seen an increased
application in private commercial contracts, and many
courts have merged analysis under frustration with
analysis under commercial impracticability...under one
view frustration is applied to excuse performance
where performance remains possible, but the value of
the performance to at least one of the parties and the
basic reason recognized by both parties for entering
into the contract have been destroyed by a supervening
and unforeseen event... The second view is similar to
the above, but recognizes the fact that a contract
never has a purpose, only the contracting parties have
a purpose; the purpose of any one of these persons can
be different than the purpose of the other. Under
this second view, when the purpose of at least one of
the parties is made worthless by a supervening event
performance is excused, depending not on the
foreseeability of the supervening event, but on which
party the risk of the event's occurrence should be
allocated.
And at page 72 9:
Under frustration analysis the Court is concerned with
the impact of the event upon the failure of the
consideration, while under impracticability the
concern is more with the nature of the event and its
effect upon performance.
In 6 Corbin on Contracts, §1323, it is said at page 333:
...it may be stated with very little qualification
that if the plaintiff has himself made it impossible
for the defendant to perform his promise, the
non-performance is not an actionable breach of duty.
No one doubts that it is unjust for the plaintiff to
make performance impossible and then to complain of it.
Indeed, action by the plaintiff that causes much less
than objective impossibility will deprive him of a
remedy and discharge the defendant from duty. If the
plaintiff's action causes no more than a personal
inability to perform on the part of the defendant, the
latter is discharged. Nor is total inability
necessary to such a result. If the plaintiff makes

-15performance by the defendant materially more difficult
or expensive, the latter will be discharged. It is
merely stating this rule in another form to say that
the duty of a contractor is constructively conditional
on the absence of material interference by the other
party.
And at §1353f page 457, it is said:
When the purpose of one party is substantialy
frustrated by the willful breach of the other, no one
doubts that such frustration ought to discharge him
from further duty. There are cases in which mutualy
promises are wholly independent and unconditional; but
they are not common. The same is true when the
nonperformance by the other party though not willful,
is caused by his subjective inability to perform. In
such cases the frustrated party has an action for
damages for breach; and we do not increase those
damages by requiring him to proceed with his own
uncompensated performance. The wrongful frustration of
his purposes operates as his discharge from duty.
(Emphasis Added)
And at page 458, it is said:
One who asserts frustration of purpose as a discharge
from duty is seldom, if ever, asserting impossibility
of performance of its own promise as a defense. ...in
setting up frustration of purpose, he is asserting a
different sort of defense. Some kind of contemplated
performance may have become impossible; but it is not
that promised performance from which he asked to be
excused.
And at §1354, page 459, it is said:
If the supervening event that causes material
frustration of purpose is willfully or negligently
caused by one of the parties, he is the one on whom
will be put the burden of the injury, including the
burden of making compensation for the injuries of
others. Often, however, such events occur without the
fault of either party, causing losses and preventing
gains. Who, then, must stand the loss or bear the
disappointment.
Unquestionably, it was to the Bank's advantage in the
prevailing market to place its funds in more productive kinds of
finance but the Bank had obtained the advantage of a noninterest-

-16bearing commercial checking account and had to know that the
commercial practices of most other banks as well as their own
would force Bean to withdraw its checking account.
POINT VI
THE BANK HOLDING COMPANY ACT OF 19 70 DID
PROSCRIBE THE TYPE OF CONTRACT AND TYING
ARRANGEMENT FORGED BY THE PLAINTIFF BANK
IN THIS TRANSACTION.
On December 31, 1970, Public Law 91-607 was passed by the
Congress and became a law of the land now designated as 12 U.S.C.
§1972 and provides in pertinent part as follows at subsection
(1):
A bank shall not in any manner extend credit/ lease or
sell property of any kind, or furnish any service, or
fix or vary the consideration for any of the foregoing,
on the condition or requirement
(C) That the customer provides some additional
credit, property, or service to such bank, other
than those related to and usually provided in
connection with a loan, discount, deposit, or
trust service;
Costner v. Blount National Bank, 578 F.2d 1192 (6th Cir.
1978) is exactly in point.

The Court declared unlawful the type

of tying arrangement regarding the offering of automobile paper
to the bank as a condition for a loan to an automobile dealer to
buy his partner's stock.

On the other hand, Sterling Coal Co.,

Inc. v. United American Bank of Knoxville, 470 F. Supp. 964 (E.D.
Tenn. 1979) simply affirms that the requirement of the bank that
the borrower's checking account be maintained at the bank as a
condition for a loan is in the nature of traditional banking
services contemplated by the conference report number 1747 91st

-17Congress 2nd Section (1970 p. 29) as set forth in plaintiff's
Memorandum.

Defendant is aware the act could not possibly be

applied retroactivly to agreements made in 1967f but after the
passage of the act in 1970f the Bank continued to require Merrill
Bean to offer its automobile and truck contracts to the bank to
qualify for the 6.5% interest rate (Bean Dep. Exh. 11 and 12).
It is apparent from the documents that the Bank modified its
position 18 0° because the Bank only required Merrill Bean to sell
its automobile contracts to the Ban* to qualify for the 6.5
interest rate without regard to the commercial checking account.
There was no consistent requirement that Bean could meet to
qualify for the 6.5 interest rate.

Initiallyf Bean could not

qualify because he removed his checking account from the Bank;
eight years later, Bean could not qualify because he would not
offer enough automobile and truck contracts after the Bank once
again decided they were in the automobile paper business, (and
again withdrew).
CONCLUSION
Bean had a right to rely upon the representations set forth
in the commitment letter of July 19, 1967 and for approximately
two years forwarded to the Bank its new and used automobile and
truck contracts consistent with the policy previously established
in the dealings between the parties and thus qualified for the
6.5% interest rate. The Bank then rejected all of Bean's
contracts, not because Bean wasn't willing to meet the lending
policies of the Bank, but because the Bank no longer had a

-18lending policy for such contracts and Bean was forced to market
its contracts elsewhere which in turn forced Bean to withdraw its
checking account from the Bank.

It was therefore the deliberate

action and policy of the Bank that set in motion the chain of
events about which the Bank now complains.

Bean was ready,

willing and able to qualify for the 6.5% interest rate but became
disqualified the minute the Bank changed its policy and the Bank
should therefore bear the risk and the loss.

The judgment of the

trial court should be reversed.
Respectfully submitted this

day of April, 1987.

BEAN & SMEDLEY

David E. Bean<
Attorney for Appellant
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JEFFREY WESTON SHIELDS (A 2948)
Attorney for Plaintiff
COMMERCIAL SECURITY BANK
50 South Main Street, Suite 2011
Salt Lake City, Utah 84130-0815
Telephone: (801) 535-1054
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
WEBER COUNTY, STTE OF UTAH
COMMERCIAL SECURITY BANK, a
Utah banking corporation,

vs.

)
)
)
)
)
)

MERRILL BEAN CHEVROLET,
a Delaware corporation.

)
)

Defendant.

)

Plaintiff,

FINDINGS OF FACT, AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Civil No. CV-095yfl47

The Motion for Summary Judgment of the plaintiff having come
duly before hearing before the Court, the Honorable David Roth,
judge, presiding, on the 22nd day of August, 1986, and the plaintiff
having appeared by and through counsel, Jeffrey Weston Shields, and
the defendant having appeared by and through counsel, David E. Bean,
Bean and Smedley, and the Court having heard arguments of counsel
and having reviewed the briefs submitted by counsel, and having made
a partial ruling from the bench at that time, and having taken other
issues remaining under advisement, and having heretofore made and
entered its written ruling on plaintiff's Motion for Summary
Judgment herein, and being herein advised in the premises, the Court
now makes and enters its;
FINDINGS OF FACT AS FOLLOWS:
1.

Plaintiff, Commercial Security Bank, loaned the sum of

$400,000.00 to defendant Merrill Bean Chevrolet on or about July 19,
1967 under the terms of a loan committment letter of that date.
2.

Said loan committment letter of July 19f 1967 provided

for said loan of $400f000.00 at a 7% rate of interest with a 20 year
amortization repayment program.

One of the terms of that agreement

provided specifically as follows:
"The Bank agrees that the interest rate will be reduced to
6.5 percent in consideration of the maintenance by you of
your commercial checking account with the Bank and the
offering by you to its Bankloan Department of new and used
automobile and truck contracts which meet the lending policy
of said Bank * * *."
3.

Subsequent to 1967, the plaintiff discontinued purchase

of the automobile dealer contracts including those of the defendant.
Defendant later withdrew its checking account from the plaintiff's
bank and the plaintiff seeks to enforce the 7% rather than 6.5 %
interest rate on the loan.
4.

The additional amount of payments remaining at the

maturity of the obligation at the 7% interest rate total in excess
of $24,000.00 and as prayed in the plaintiff's complaint.
5.

There is no evidence that the 7% interest rate is an

unreasonable rate considering the time at which this loan was made
and the circumstances under which the transaction was consumated.
6.

Defendant claims that the plaintiff's failure to accept

defendant's dealer paper caused the defendant to shop elsewhere for
banking services and that other banks would not finance defendant's
dealer paper unless defendant transferred its checking account to
that bank.

Thus, defendant argues that it was forced to transfer

its checking account and plaintiff then increased the interest rate

to 7% on the loan.

Defendant further argues that the plaintiff's

refusal to accept defendant's dealer paper made it impossible for
the defendant to perform the terms of the contract.
7.

In addition, the defendant argues that the plaintiff's

refusal to accept the defendant's dealer paper made it impossible
for the defendant to perform under the terms of the contract and in
addition to the impossibility of performance argument defendant also
argues that the plaintiff is equitably estopped from enforcing the
higher 7% rate against it.

Defendant also argues that the contract

constitutes an unlawful "tying agreement" in violation on the Bank
Holding Company Act of 1970.
8.

This obligation is secured by a note and deed of trust

upon the defendant's dealership property which, by its terms,
affords the plaintiff a power of sale upon default.
Having heretofore made its Findings of Fact, the Court, being
duly informed in the premises, now makes and enters its;
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AS FOLLOWS:
1.

The loan committment letter of July 19, 1967 constitutes

a contract between the parties which allows the plaintiff Bank to
stop purchasing dealer contracts from the defendant if the Bank
determines that such contracts no longer meet the lending policy of
the Bank; the Bank changed policy to discontinue purchase of dealer
contracts from any dealers which it was entitled to do under the
contract.
2.

By terminating the purchase of the defendant's dealer

contracts, the Court concludes that the Bank has not committed any
act or acts which violate the terms of the contract.

3.

Under the terms of the contract, the Court finds that the

plaintiff has the ability to unilaterally determine whether or not
the defendant will qualify for the .5 % discount on the loan
interest rate and therefore, the acts of the plaintiff in
terminating the purchase of the defendant's dealer contract did not
render the defendant's performance under the contract impossible.
4.

The Court finds that the terms of the July 19, 1967 loan

committment letter do not render the contract an unlawful tying
agreement under the terms of the Bank Holding Company Act of 1970,
or the Sherman Act*
5.

The note and deed of trust along with the July 19, 1967

committment letter are the three documents which comprise the
entirety of this transaction/ and the Court finds that the same are
integrated contracts containing all of the terms and agreements as
between the partiesf and the Court therefore does not consider any
other document or communication as modifying the terms of the
agreement stated by said 3 documents.
6.

The plaintiff's complaint is not barred by the applicable

Statute of Limitations.
7.

The plaintiff's complaint is not barred or limited by the

equitable doctrine of Laches.
8.

The plaintiff is entitled to judgment in the sum prayed

for in its complaint, and is entitled to a decree of this Court
allowing it to foreclose the security interest set forth in the deed
of trust which is an issue in this action as a note and a mortgage
and to its attorney's fees and costs of court as therein provided or
by power of sale.

WHEREFORE, having hereinabove made and entered its Findings
of Fact and Conclusions of Law, judgment shall enter thereon
accordingly.
DATED this

/ft

day of December, 1986

BY THE COURT:

DAVID E ROTH
David Roth
Second District Judge

JEFFREY WESTON SHIELDS (A 2948)
Attorney for Plaintiff
COMMERCIAL SECURITY BANK
50 South Main Street, Suite 2011
Salt Lake City, Utah 84130-0815
Telephone: (801) 53 5-1054
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
COMMERCIAL SECURITY BANK, a
Utah banking c o r p o r a t i o n ,

)
I

JUDGMENT

Plaintiff,
vs.

1

MERRILL BEAN CHEVROLET,
a Delaware corporation.

i

C i v i l No. CV-095jpTl47

!

Defendant.

The motion of the plaintiff for Summary Judgment having come
duly before the Court for hearing, the Honorable David Rothr Judger
presiding, on the 22nd day of August, 1986, and the plaintiff having
appeared by and through counsel, Jeffrey Weston Shields, and
defendant having appeared by and through counsel, David E. Bean,
Bean and Smedley, and the Court having heard agruments of counsel
and having reviewed the briefs and memoranda of the parties filed
herein, and being duly advised in the premises, and having
heretofore made and entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law, and being prepared to rule thereon, it is now by the Court:
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED AS FOLLOWS:
1. That plaintiff is awarded judgment as against the
defendant in the sum of $24,455.16 principal, $5,710.96 of accrued
interest from June 1, 1983 until October 2, 1986 and thereafter

accruing at the rate of $4*75 per diem and the sum of $222.85 for
advanced costs in reference to said deed of trust;
2.

For the additional sum of $5,000.00 as and for attorney's

fees;
3. For the further sum of $56.75 as costs of Court;
4.

Plaintiff is entitled to foreclose as against the

defendant that certain deed of trust dated and executed on the 3rd
day of August, 1967 and recorded on the records of the Weber County
Recorder, State of Utah as Entry Number 494442, Book 872, Pages 271
through 273 inclusive for the purpose of enforcing and collecting
the sum of money awarded as judgment hereinabove, the same being
secured by said deed of trust, and the Weber County Sheriff is
authorized by these premises to conduct a sale thereon and to assess
any deficiency thereafter due.
DATED this

lb

day of December, 1986.

BY THE COURT:
DAVID E ROTH
David Roth,
District Judge

David E. Bean

COMMERCIAL SECURITY BANK
WASHINGTON BOULEVARD AT TWENTY-FIFTH STREET
P. O. BOX 1480 • OGDEN, UTAH 84402

July 19, 1967

Merrill Bean Chevrolet, Inc.
2626 Washington Boulevard
Ogden, Utah
Attn:

Mr, Merrill Bean

Gentlemen:
Commercial Security Bank, hereafter referred to as said bank, hereby
commits to lend Merrill Bean Chevrolet, Inc. the sum of $400,000.00,
TU interest, for a term of 15 years with a 20 year amortization repayment program. This commitment is subject to the following terms:
1. This loan to be secured by a first mortgage on approximately eight
acres of land located at the northwest corner of Wall Avenue and Harris
Street, Ogden, Utah and improvements to be constructed according to plans
as presented to said bank, upon which said bank made its appraisal.
2. A CLTA Title Insurance Policy issued by a.-title company acceptable
to said bank, showing good and marketable title with no lien exceptions
other than the bank's first mortgage and current years taxes,
3. The loan of $400,000.00 to be based upon the following ratio: twothirds of the cost of the land and two-thirds of the cost of the improvements. All personal property including office furniture and equipment,
shop equipment, excluding carpets and drapes, will not be considered as
part of the real estate improvements and will have to be paid in cash by
Merrill Bean Chevrolet, Inc.
4. Broad form fire and extended coverage insurance, at your expense,
for the amount of the improvements with an insurance company satisfactory
to said bank having a general rating of A and a financial rating of not
less than BBB-f as rated by the Best Insurance Guide of 1966. A certificate
of insurance from such a recognized company will be acceptable, properly
endorsed with a loss payable clause in favor of the bank to insure its
interest.
5. A survey with a plat by a licensed engineer or surveyor of the State
of Utah, shewing that all improvements are located on the property and a
Certificate from proper authority showing that the same are built in accordance with the zoning and regulatory authorities.
6. The contractor and the written contract to be approved by the bank.
Performance and payment bonds complying with the laws of Utah and approved
by the bank's legal counsel shall be furnished by the contractor and written
by a surety company approved by the bank.

o
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Merrill Bean Chevrolet, Inc.

July 19, 1967

Page 2

7. Disbursements from the loan proceeds for the construction of the
improvements will be disbursed as the work progresses upon written evidence
from the architect stating that said work is performed in a satisfactory and
workmanlike manner and written evidence acceptable to said bank that no liens
or unpaid bills are outstanding at the time of each disbursement. Disbursements*
and construction will be also governed by the bank's standard building and loan
agreement which you will be required to sign*
8. The bank agrees that the interest rate will be reduced to 6^7. in consideration of the maintenance by you of your commercial checking account with
the bank and the offering by you to its Bankloan Department of new and used
automobile and truck contracts which meet the lending policy of said bank.' As
further consideration for the above, the bank agrees to waive all fees and
charges in connection with this loan except title insurance, survey, recording
and usual out of pocket expenses in connection with closing and would further
extend prepayment privileges as follows:
After 5 years from date, all or part of the principal of this note may
be paid in advance without penalty. Within such 5 year period, the
makers reserve the privilege, which shall NOT be cumulative from one
year to another, to pay without penalty amounts which are greater, provided
that the extra payments to principal are no more than 20% of the original
principal balance in any one note year. The makers agree to pay a prepayment fee for amounts paid in excess of the 207» as follows: 17. of the
original loan amount if paid during the first Syears of the loan.
9. Written acceptance of this commitment is required within ten days after
date of commitment. Said commitment will expire after sixty days if construction has not commenced on said improvements. Payments on note to commence six
months after date construction begins.
10. It is agreed that paragraph 8 of the bank's standard form trust deed,
pursuant to your request, will be deleted.
Sincerely,

Jordon L. Belnap
Vice-President
GLB/mk

The terms of this commitment are hereby accepted this
1967.
M e r r i l l Beai^ChevroJ^t, Inc.
BY:
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For value received, I, we, or either of us. promise to pay to COMMERCIAL SECURITY BANK of Ogden, Utah, or order,
at its offices in Ogden, Utah, the principal sum of

FOUR HUNDRED THOUSAND and NO/100

Dollar*. -

with interest thereon from the date hereof until paid at the rate of
payable only in lawful money of the United States of America.

7

% per annum, both principal and Interest
m

It is understood and agreed, however, that monthly installments of

,. 1 10? OO * THREE THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED T W O and NO/100
(I J f j.uz y uu )
i —_

_
Dollars,

_

Including interest, shall be paid on this note, the first of said Installments to be paid on the
15th
day of
klanuftxy
, 19-5IL. and one of said installments to be paid on the
15th
day of each
and every month thereafter until the
15th
flay
Jtecember^
^ 19J*?L, at which time
0f
the whole of the unpaid principal, together with the accrued Interest, shall be due; each of said monthly installments to be
applied first to the payment of accrued interest on the unpaid principal, and the balance thereof to be credited on aaid principal.
After
Within such

?

years from date, all or part of the principal of this note may be paid in advance without penalty. _
...

year period, the makers reserve the privilege, which shall NOT be cumulative from one year to

another, to pay without penalty amounts which are greater, provided that the extra payments to principal are no more than
2.Q

% of the original principal balance in any one note year. The makers agree to pay a prepayment fee for

amounts paid in excess of the

?"

first XKK years of the loan and

*™*®.

% as follows:

1

% of the original loan amount If paid during the

% of the original loan amount if paid during the next

±2

years.

And in case default be made in the payment of any of said Installments of principal or interest at the times and in the
manner aforesaid, then such installment or payment, installments or payments, so in default, shall be added to and become a
art of the principal sum, and from the date when each installment should have been paid until it is paid It shall bear the
same rate of interest as the principal debt, being a part thereof; and at any time during such default in payment or in the
performance of any agreement, covenant or condition in the Trust Deed securing this note, the holder hereof, at its option, and
without notice or demand, may declare the entire principal balance and accrued interest due and payable.
In the event any installment of principal and interest shall remain unpaid for a period of 15 days after due, the undersigned, at the option of the holder hereof and upon demand, agree to pay as a late charge a sum equivalent to two {!%) percent
of the principal amount of such installment.
If this note be placed for collection, either with or without suit, the undersigned jointly and severally agree to pay all
costs and expenses thereof, including a reasonable attorney's fee.
The makers, guarantors and endorsers hereby severally waive presentment for payment, demand, notice of dishonor, protest
and notice of protest and of non-payment of this note, and all defenses on the ground of any extension of the time of payment
that may be given by the holder to them or any of them; and also agree that further payments of principal or interest in reaewal thereof shall not release them as makers, guarantors or endorsers.

MERRILL BEAN CHEVROLET INCORPORATED
BYr

— / s / — J T - w r Bean, president
ATTEST:
757
Mailing Addressi
Property Addressi
8-

Vust Deed Note
nstallments including interest.
E: 70 5M Rev. 6/66
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COMMERCIAL SECURITY BANK
Ogden,
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TRUST DEED

/.A

With Assignment of Rents

^

-

/ «r

3rd
August
THIS TRUST DEED, made this
day of
between —
MERRILL BEAN CHEVROLET INCORPORATED,^
whose address it „

Corporation

67
19
as TRUSTOR.

__
COMMERCIAL SECURITY BANK, a

Corpora•tion_

as
as
WITNESSETH That Trustor CONVEYS AND WARRANTS TO TRUSTEE IN TRUST. WITH POWER
Weber
following described property, situated in
.._. County, State of

TRUSTEE, and
BENEFICIARY
OF SALE, the
Utah:

A part of the Northwest Quarter of Section 5, Township 5 North, Range 1 West, of the Salt
Lake Base and Meridian, United States Survey: Beginning at a point on the West line of
Wall Avenue 524.9 feet North 89° 46' 20" West and North 0° 58' East 392.0 feet from
the Southeast corner of said Northwest £Xiarter Section, said point being at Ogden City
Engineer's "A" Station 27+94.00 and "B" Station 76+40.20; running thence North 89° 46* 20"
West 691.0 feet; thence North 0° 58' East 5C1. 5 feet; thence South 89° 46* 20" East 691.0
feet; thence South 0° 58' West 501. 5 feet to the point of beginning. Containing 8.0 acres.

///////////////////////

i

P
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^Together with all buildings, fixtures and improvements thereon and all water rights, rights of way. easements, rents, issues,
fcjroftts. income, tenements, hereditaments, privileges and appurtenances thereunto belonging, now or hereafter used or enjoyed
rtfith said properly, or an> part thereof. SUBJECT. HOWEVER, to the right, power and authority hereinafter given to and
conferred upon lieneficiarv to collect and apply such rents, issues, and profits;
FOR THE PURPOSE OF SECURING ( 1 ) payment of the indebtedness and all other lawful charges evidenced by a promissory note of even date herewith, in the principal sum of % 4 0 0 , 0 0 0 * 0 0
made by Trustor, payable to
the order of lieneficiarv at all times, in the manner and with Interest as therein set forth, and any extensions and/or renewal*
or modifications thereof. ( 2 ) the performance of each agreement of Trustor herein contained: ( 3 ) the payment of auch additional loans or advances as hereafter ma> be made to Trustor, or his successors or assigns, when evidenced by a promissory
note or notes reciting that they are secured hv thin Trust heed; and (4} the pavment of all sums expended or adraneed by
Beneficiary under or pursuant to the terms hereof, together *ith Interest thereon as herein provided.

TO PROTECT THE SECURITY OF THIS TRUST DEED. TTRUSTOR AGREES:
1, To keep said property in good condition and repair, not to remove or demolish any building thereon; to complete or
restore promptly and in good and workmanlike manner aim building which may be constructed, damaged or destroyed thereon;
to comply with all lawa. covenants and restrictions affectir-i: said property; not to commit or permit waste thereof; not to
commit, suffer or permit any act upon said property in v i o l a t i o n of Jaw; to do all other acts which from the character or use
of said property may be reasonably necessary, the specific enumerations herein not excluding the general; and. If the loan
secured hereby or any.part thereof is being obtained for the purpose of financing construction of Improvements on said property.
Trustor further agrees:
(a) To commence construction promptly and to pursue *ame with reasonable diligence to completion in accordance with
plans and specifications satisfactory to Beneficiary, and
(b) To allow Beneficiary to inspect said property at a*H times during construction.
Trustee, upon presentation to It of an affidavit signed >•?" Beneficiary, setting forth facts showing a default by Trustor
under this numbered paragraph, is authorized to accept a* true and conclusive all fact* and statements therein, and to act
thereon hereunder.
J. To provide and maintain insurance against such casualties as Beneficiary may require. In an amount, for such term,
and In a company or companies satisfactory to Beneficial- with loss payable clauses In favor of and In a form satisfactory
to Beneficiary In «he event of loss or damage. Trustor sha-'J give immediate notice to Beneficiary. Beneficiary may makt
proof of loss and settle and adjust all claims thereunder applying the proceeds at its option, to reduction of the amount
due hereunder, or 10 the restoration or repair of the pro:,***rty damaged
Payment of such loss may be made directly to
Beneficiary. In the event of the refusal or neglect of Tru^'or to provide insurance or to maintain same, or to renew same
in a manner satisfactory to Beneficiary, then Beneficial may itself procure and maintain such insurance and charge the
cost thereof to Trustor under the provisions of paragraph: 7 hereof. Beneficiary shall not be required to accept or approve any policy of insurance or any renewal of an ex:s *Jng policy, which is not delivered to it prior to 30 days before the
expiration date of existing coverage even though the sanv* may be otherwise satisfactory to beneficiary.
3 To deliver to, pay for and maintain with Beneficiar"1 until the indebtedness secured hereby is paid in full, such evidence
of title as Beneficiary may require, including abstracts of t." ;e or policies of title Insurance and any extensions or renewals
thereof or supplements thereto.
4 To appear in and defend any action or proceeding pi-rl>orting t o affect the security hereof, the title to said property, or
the rights or powers of beneficiary or Trustee, and shoulf. Beneficiary or Trustee elect to also appear in or defend any such
action or proceeding, to pay all costs and expenses, inc. ~dirig cost of evidence of title and attorney's fees in a reasonable
sum incurred by Beneficiary or Trustee
5, To pay at least 10 days before delinquency all tax^-t and assessments affecting said property, including all assessments
upon water company stock and all rents, assessments and c marges for water, appurtenant to or used in connection with said
property; to pay, when due, all encumbrances,, charges, ar.'. liens with interest, on said property or any part thereof, which at
any time appear to be prior or superior hereto, to pay a. costs, fees, and expenses of this Trust.
6 Should Trustor fail to make any payment or to do a : v act as herein provided then Beneficiary or Trustee, but without
tbligation so to do and without notice to or demand upor Trustor and without releasing Trustor from any obligation hereof,
may Make or do the same in such manner and to such # .• lent as either may deem necessary to protect the security hereof.
Beneficiary or Trustee being authorized to enter upon s a . : property for such purposes. Commence, appear in and defend any
action or proceeding purporting to affect the security her* 'A or the rights or powers of Beneficiary or Trustee; pay. purchase,
contest, or compromise any encumbrance, charge or lien -»hich in the judgment of either appears to be prior or superior
hereto, and in exercising any such powers, incur any lability, expend whatever amounts in its absolute discretion It mi)
deem necessary therefor, including cost of evidence of tlr *. employ counsel, and pay his reasonable fees
7. To pay immediately and without demand ail surr \ expended hereunder by Beneficiary or Trustee, with interest
from date of expenditure at the rate of ten per cent (10 ' . > I>er annum until paid, and the repayment thereof shall be
secured hereby.
%—Not to make any voluntary inter vivos transfer fi the premises or any part thereof without first obtaining the
ff, written consent of the Beneficiary. A»v such transfer, it the Beneficiary shall not so consent, shall constitute a default
'^,4 under the terms of this instrument
and the note it secure- and Beneficiary may cause same to be foreclosed, and the premises
/^/y
Instrui
/'/ sold, according to law and the provisions hereof.
V
/
IT IS MUTUALLY AGREED TJ
THAT:
9 Should Bald property or any part thereqf be taken or damaged by reason of any public improvement or condemnation
proceeding, or damaged by fire, or earthquake, or in any other manner. Beneficiary shall be entitled to all compensation,
awards, and other payments or relief therefor, and shall t<e entitled at its option to commence, appear in and prosecute In
its own name, any action or proceedings, or to make any '-ompromise or settlement, in connection with such taking or
damage Ail such compensation, awards, damages, rights "f action and proceeds, including the proceeds of any policies of
fire and other insurance affecting said properly, are hereby assigned to Beneficiary, who may. after deducting therefrom
all its expenses, including attorney's fees, apply the same "» any indebtedness secured hereby Trustor agrees to execute
such further assignments of any compensation, award, damages, and rights of action and proceeds as Beneficiary or Trustee
may require.
10. At any time and from time to time upon written request of Beneficiary, payment of its fees and presentation of
this Trust Deed and liu? note for endorsement (in case of full reconveyance for cancellation and retention), without affecting the liability of any person for the payment of the indebtedness secured hereby. Trustee may (a) consent to the making of
any map or plat of said property, (b) join in granting uny easement or creating an) restriction thereon, tc) join in any
subordination or other agreement affecting this Trust D««-d or the lien or charge thereof; (d) reconvey. without warrant),
all or any part of said property. The grantee in any reconveyance ma> be described as "the person or persons entitled
thereto", and the recitals therein of any matters or fact* shall be conclusive proof of the truthfulness thereof. Trustor
agrees to pay reasonable Trustee's fees for any of the services mentioned in this paragraph.
11 As additional security. Trustor hereby assigns t<» Beneficiary, during the continuance of these trusts, all rents,
issues, royalties, and profits of the property affected by this Trust Deed and of any personal property located thereon
ntil Trustor shall default In the payment of any indebtedness secured hereby or in the performance of any agreement
hereunder. Trustor shall have the right to collect all sui h rents. Issues, royalties and profits earned prior to default as
they become due act payable If Trustor shall default a« aforesaid. Trustors right to collect any of such moneys shall cease
and Beneficiary shall have the right, with or without taking possession or the property affected hereb). to collect all rents,
royalties, Issues, and profits Failure or discontinuance of Beneficiary at any time or from time to time to collect any such
moneys shall not in any manner affect the subsequent enforcement by Beneficiary of the right, power, and authorit) to
collect the same Nothing contained herein, nor the excr< IH« of the right by Beneficiar) to collect, shall be. or be construed
to be, an affirmation by Beneficiary of any tenancy. leuHi- or option, nor an assumption of liability under, nor a subordination of the lien or charge of this Trust Deed to any such tenancy, lease or option
12 Upon default by Trustor hereunder. Beneficiary nia> at any time without notice, either in person, by agent, or
by a receiver to be appointed by a court (Trustor hereb) consenting to the appointment of Beneficiary as such receiver),
and without regard to the adequacy of any security for !>»*• Indebtedness hereb) secured, enter upon and take possession
of said property or any part thereof, and in its own name NO*- or otherwise collect said rents, issues, and profits. Including
those past due and unpaid, and apply the same, less cowl* and expenses or operation and collection. Including reasonable
fattorney's fees, upon any indebtedness secured hereby, and in such order as Beneficiary may determine.
I
13. The entering upon and taking possession of salt! property, the collection of such rents, issues, and profits, or the
nYoceeds of fire and other Insurance policies, or compciiHution or award* for any taking or damage or said property, and
the application or release thereof as aforesaid, shall not cure or waite an> default or notice of default hereunder or
Invalidate any act done pursuant to such notice.

I

14. The failure on the pari of Beneficiary to promptly enforce anv right hereunder shall not operate as a waiver of
aucb right and the waiver by Beneficiary of any default ahall not constitute a waiver of any other or subsequent default.
15 Time Is of the essence hereof Upon default u> Trustor in the pavment of anv Indebtedness secured hereby or In the
performance of any agreement hereunder, all »ums secured hereby shall immediately become due and payable at the option
of Beneficiar) In the event of such default. Beneficing may execute or ruuse Trustee to execute a written notice of
default and of election to cause said property to be sold to satisf) the obligations hereof, and Trustee shall file such notice
for record In each county wherein said property or som«< part or parrel thereof Is situated Beneficiary also shall deposit
with Trustee, the note and all documents evidencing expenditures secured hereby.

, 16. After the lapse of such time as may then be required by law following the recordation of said notice of default,
and notice of default and notice of sale having been given as then required by law. Trustee, without demand on Trustor,
shall •***' * a , d Prr>l>tfrtv o 0 the date and at the time and place designated lit said notice of sale, either as a whole or in
(krMle> parcels, and In such order as it may determine (but subject to any statutory right of Trustor to direct the order
*|tlch such property, if consisting of several known lots or parcels, shall he sold), at public auction to the highest
bidder* thetorpurchase
price payable In au/ul money of the United States at the time of sale. The person conducting the
a n v rauHe
aaie i"*?'
he deems expedient, postpone the sale from time to time until it shall be completed and. in v\ery
ttse n o t i c e u f
such •' '
pontponemunt shull be given by public declaration thereof by such person at the time and place last
^uted
for
the
sale,
provided,
if the sale is postponed for longer than one day beyond the day designated In the notice
of i»i*'e- notice thereof shall be given in the same manner as the original notice of sale. Trustee shall execute and deliver
to th* pur-chaser
its Deed conve\ing said property so sold, but without any covenant or warranty, express or implied. The
recll"'* *n t n e Deed of any mutters or fact shall be conclusive proof of the truthfulness thereof. Any person, including
Iten^firtary. may hid at tiie Hale Trustee shall apply the proceeds of the sale to payment of I X) the costs end expenses of
e x e n K i « g the power of sale and of sale, including the payment of the Trustee's and attorney's fees actually incurred hv the
Truf'1'* a n d t n e Beneficiary but not to exceed ten « 10*, ) per cent of the unpaid indebtedness at the*time of such sale with
the 'minimum
totul of said fees not to be less than $250.00; « 21 cost of any evidence of title procured In connection with
such **' e an<* revenue stumps on Trustee's Deed; (.1) all sums expended under the terms hereof, not then repaid, with
accrued interest at 10'; per annum from dale of expenditure; (41 all other sums then secured hereby; and (5) the remainder, if any. to the person or persons legally entitled thereto, or the Trustee. In its discretion, may deposit the balance
of s*Kn proceeds with the County Clerk of the county in which the sale took place
17 Upon the occurrence of any default hereunder. Beneficiary shall have the option to declare all sums secured
hereeV immediately
due and payable and foreclose this Trust Deed in the manner provided by law for the foreclosure oi
morU** e s o n r e a ' property and Beneficiary shall be entitled to recover in such proceedings all costs and expense!
incident thereto, including a reasonable attorney's fee in such amount as shall be fixed by the court.
IS. Beneficiary may appoint a successor trustee at any time by filing for record in the office of the County Recorder
of e*ch county
in which said property or some part thereof is situated, a substitution of trustee From the time the substitution i s f e d for record, the new trustee shall succeed to ail the powers, duties, authority and title of the trustee named
ner<>tu or of any successor trustee. Each such substitution shall be executed and acknowledged, and notice thereof shall
D e fit-en and proof thereof made, in the manner provided by law.
IS. This Trust Deed shall apply to. inure to the benefit of. and bind all parties hereto, their heirs, legatees, devisees.
and assigns. All obligations ot Trustor hereunder are joint and several. The term
a( j n iiii$trators. executors, successors
"Be*t*' ic ' ar y shall mean the owner and holder, including any pledgee, of the note secured hereby In this Trust Deed,
whenever the text so requires, the masculine gender includes the feminine and/or neuter, and the singular number includes
the |dural.
+t) Trustee accepts this Trust when this Trust Deed, duly executed and acknowledged, la made a public record as
provided by law. Trustee is not obligated to notify any party hereto of pending sale under any other Trust Deed or of
any *vt | o n i n which Trustor, Beneficiary, or Trustee shall be a party, unless brought by Trustee.
•I. This Trust Deed shall be construed according to the laws of the State of Utah,
+1 The undersigned Trustor requests that a copy of any notice of default and of any notice of sale hereunder be
-ma.ll*«l t o him at the address hereinbefore set forth.
IN WITNESS. WHEREOF THE Trustor has caused these presents to be executed the day and year first above written.
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MERRILL BEKN CHEVROLET INCORPORATED

^;.-.'.

SecretaryTreasurer...

/^..

INDIVIDUAL ACKNOWLEDGMENT
STATE of
COVNTY OF

I

On the

ln«»

*i<ner

day of

_

19

, personally appeared before m*

of the above instrument, who duly acknowledged to me that

he

executed the same.

Notary Public
Residing at
My commission expires:

CORPORATE ACKNOWLEDGMENT
g f iTS of —
C*«VTY OF

UTAH
j
_WEBER._"1 . . . . { " •

f On the _ 3 ? £
day of
August
10_i=LZ.. personally appeared before me
.*?;. M * j
^ £ £ 3 L . K * ^ A . ^ . h e £ f L . . who being by me duly *worn did »ay that they are the
MEI
„ I _ Secretary/resellvJl^of
* * a L L BEAN CHEVROLET INCORPORATED

Ajv*>

e a n

president and

•ration, *od
and that ***<*
said instrument was signed In behalf of said <corporation by authority of a resolution, of It* Board of
coloration.
a rn
J e r r
p5e L
*
f » . and said
.aid W^,„-JL^.Jl'..
and
Y K* Whitehead
and each of
a
nd _ .
D l f ^mn,
r-^i»*li.-9S
lb*.* acknowledge to^ ifte. that said corporation executed the same.

*•
—

" V*
r. .-s

^
»V- • - . n: - :

•4. C b m m i s s i o n E m p i r e s •

_ f ^ ^ - J / „ <^U-e-a
&*&&-*/

Notary Public
Residing at Oqdffn ,

Utah

REQUEST FOR FULL RECONVEYANCE
(To be used only when indebtedness secured hereby has been paid in full)
TO.

TRUSTEE

The undersigned is the legal owner and holder of the note and all other indebtedness secured by the within Trust
Deed Said note, together with all other indebtedness secured by said Trust Deed has been fully paid and satisfied; and
you are hereby requested and directed, on payment to you of any sums owing to you under the terms of said Trust Deed,
to cancel said note above mentioned, and all other evidences of indebtedness secured by said Trust Deed delivered to you
herewith, together with the said Trust Deed, and to reconvey, without warranty, to the parties designated by the terms
of said Trust Deed, all the estate now held by you thereunder.
Dated

10-

Mall reconveyance to

I"-

•
to
C
W

O

15

m
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o
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ROY C. NELSON
Senior Vice President
Credit Administration

December 26, 1979

Mr. J. Merrill Bean
Merrill Bean Chevrolet
3535 Wall Avenue
Ogden, Utah
84401
Dear Merrill:
Thank you for your letter requesting that we review the interest
rate charged against your real estate loan. A search of our
records indicates that during the years 1977 and 1978, when you
were selling the required number of contracts to qualify for a
reduction, that the interest rate was not reduced from 1% to 6*5%.
We have today issued a credit to your account in the amount of
$3,146.07 to correct the matter. Included in the credit adjustment is the computation of interest for 1979 at 7% on a lower
principal balance.
If you have any questions regarding this transaction, please call
me. I appreciate your calling this matter to my attention.
May I take this opportunity to wish you and your associates a
happy and successful new year.
Sincerely,

/

Roy t. Nelson
Senior Vice President

enclosure

c#-^ „> r;,w s»uth Salt Lake Citv. Utah 64111
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C NELSON
fi0Y
$enJor Vice President
Credit Administration
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EXHIBIT
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January 18, 1980

Mr. J. Merrill Bean
Merrill Bean Chevrolet
3535 Wall Avenue
Ogden, Utah 84401
Dear Merrill:
Thank you for the note of January 4, 1980 expressing your appreciation
for the credit memo. However, the last sentence concerns me that we might
have a misunderstanding. When the Real Estate loan was originated, one
of the conditions of the loan was that the interest rate would be reduced
to 6*5% in consideration of the maintenance by you of your commercial checking
account with the bank, and the offering by you to our Bankloan Department
a minimum of 50% of controlled contracts of new and used automobile and
truck contracts which meet the lending policy of the bank.
Although at the present time, and for some time, we regret that you have
not maintained your commercial checking account with us, we did reduce the
interest on your Real Estate loan for the years 1977 and 1978 from 7% to
6^% based on the purchase of contracts from your company. As I explained
in my letter of December 26, 1979, we did not reduce the 1979 interest
rate because we had not purchased significant contracts from your company,
but did adjust the principal balance for that year.
I hope 1980 will be a banner year for your company.
jcerely,

Roy cQNelson
Senior Vice President

sh

C#«#» nt Pint Knuth- Salt LaJcM Citv
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AUTO DEALER AGREEMENT
NON RECOURSE
THIS AGREEMENT e n t e r e d i n t o a t Ogden, Weber C o u n t y ,
Utah,^JM>^ig»Mi^^rf^uiMi)i
between

by and

Merrill Bean Chevrolet, Inc.

called "Dealer",
hereinafter

f

hereinafter

and COMMERCIAL SECURITY BANK, Ogden f U t a h ,

c a l l e d "Dank", and i s i n t e n d e d t o g o v e r n t h e

p u r c h a s e by Bank from D e a l e r o f m o t o r v e h i c l e
s a l e s e c u r i t y agreements r e p r e s e n t i n g
t o p u r c h a s e r s o f new and u s e d motor
The p a r t i e s m u t u a l l y a g r e e a s

installment

t h e s a l e by D e a l e r

vehicles.
follows:

**mmmi**Fim UlUUL 11UU UUdULl 11UUI LJJ11L torn
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by Dealer covering the sale of new and used vehicles executed
on forms acceptable to the Bank, and at current rates of
discount from time to time established by the Bank.
liaigiiHi

2.

(Ulna iimilL

LU U1ULUIUIL Ul

pii

The purchase price to be paid by the Bank for each

such agreement shall be the total unpaid contract balance
shown thereon discounted at the rate currently in effect.
The purchase price shall be paid to the Dealer, or at
Dealerfs option, credited to his account upon proper execution
of the assignment of the agreement and delivery of the
document to the Bank.

The Bank thereafter shall succeed

to all the right, title, estate and interest of the Dealer
under said agreement.

The Dealer shall furnish evidence

Df

insurance by a company acceptable to Bank protecting

the Bank and the Dealer as their interests may appear
covering comprehensive and collision ($100.00 deductible
minimum).

The Bank at its option, may procure such

insurance and charge the same against the contract*balance.
3.

If the total unpaid contract balance shown on the

agreement at the time of purchase shall exceed the amount
for which such contract was purchased by the Bank, plus the
amount of the discount, the excess shall be credited to the
Dealerfs reserve account with the Bank.

This account shall

also be credited with Dealer's insurance participations and
charged with unearned insurance participations resulting from
cancellation of policies prior to their expiration dates.
Thereafter on a monthly basis, except as hereafter provided,
and if Dealer be not in default on any obligation to the
Bank, howsoever arising, the Bank shall remit to the Dealer
from the reserve account, the amount by which the credit
balance insaid account shall, at the date of payment, exceed
one-half of one percent (.5%) of the aggregate unpaid balance
of all security agreements purchased from Dealer.

This

reserve account, however, is hereby continually pledged
and assigned for all of Dealer's obligations to the Bank,
now or hereafter existing, absolute or contingent including
Dealerfs share of any unearned finance charge refunded to
purchasers of vehicles upon prepayment of agreements purchased
hereunder and any finance charge unpaid if a motor vehicle
be repossessed, with the right in the Bank accordingly to

apply

suc

4.

h reserve or any part thereof.
The Bank shall make all collections under agree-

ments which it shall purchase and shall effect repossessions
when necessary, all at its expense, provided, however, that
whenever any of the following shall occur:
(a)

If any agreement purchased by the Bank is in
violation of any law, public policy, or regulation
of any city, county, state or federal governmental
agency or is held to be not legally enforceable
for any reason whatsoever.

(b)

If any of the covenants, warranties or representations made by the Dealer in the assignment of a
security agreement are breached, violated or held
to be untrue.

(c)

If any loss to the Bank shall occur under any
agreement as a result of failure of the Dealer
properly to complete the registration of any
vehicle showing the interest or lien of the Bank.

(d)

If possession of a motor vehicle, the contract or
agreement covering which is purchased by the Bank
hereunder, was obtained by any fraudulent scheme,
trick or device on the part of the buyer thereof

the particular security agreement less any unearned finance
charges and the Bank will thereupon reassign said agreement
to the Dealer.

^t way elect and in particular may apply the Dealerfs
reserve account to any direct or contingent obligation of
the Dealer in favor of the Bank.
9*

Dealer agrees to pay and discharge all costs, and

expenses that may arise from enforcing this agreement or
any rights arising or created hereunder in favor of the Bankf
including reasonable attorneyfs fees.
10.

The waiver by Bank of any breach or default of

the terms, covenants or agreements of this agreement shall
be limited to the particular instance and shall not operate
as a waiver of any further breach or default of the terms,
covenants or agreements contained herein.
11.

If any provision of this agreement shall be

invalid, the other terms and conditions shall remain in
full force and effect.
12.

This agreement shall be irrevocable until all

agreements purchased hereunder by Bank from Dealer shall
have been paid in full to Bank, and shall inure to the
benefit of the respective heirs, personal representatives,
successors and assigns of the parties hereto, and any
company or organization subsidiary to or affiliated with
Bank to whom Bank may assign this agreement and/or cause
to purchase agreements from dealer as herein set forth.
That, except as herein otherwise specifically provided,
Dealer hereby waives notice of non-payment, repossession
and all other notices to which Dealer might otherwise be
entitled by law.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF t h e p a r t i e s have caused t h e s e
p r e s e n t s t o be e x e c u t e d t h e day and y e a r f i r s t

above

written.

Merrill Bean Chevrolet, Inc.
v i d u a 1 o r f i r m name)
Title
COMMERCIAL SECURITY BANK
By

\-<^.i

/- •o

/ ////

.<-/-

Title

CONTRACT PURCHASED TERMS

Maximum
Term

Amount
Advanced

Rate

100% DDCTL

kh%

Current year model (new)

36

Current year model (used)

36

95% ( Used Car

Previous Year Model

30

90% ( Guide

h\%

(

h^k

(

30

Z & 3 previous year model

90% ( Wholesale

5 %

(

h & 5 previous year model

2k

90% ( Value

.der
6 previous year model and older

18

85% (

5%%

(

Minimum service charge $15

—

6 %

Minimum payment $25

If Dealer gives a warranty on automobiles older than previous
year's model, a copy of such warranty must accompany contract at
time of purchase and cover automobile if repossessed.

12 USCS § 1972

TYING ARRANGEMENTS

RESEARCH GUIDE
Federal Procedure L Ed:
Banking and Financing, Fed Proc, L Ed, §§ 8:768, 8:772.
Am Jur:
54 Am Jur 2d, Monopolies, Restraints of Trade, and Unfair Trade
Practices §§ 425.5, 426.
Law Review Articles:
Clark, The Soundness of Financial Intermediaries. 86 Yale L J 1.

§ 1972, Certain tying arrangements prohibited; correspondent accounts
(1) A bank shall not in any manner extend credit, lease or sell property of
any kind, or furnish any service, or fix or vary the consideration for any of
the foregoing, on the condition or requirement—
(A) that the customer shall obtain some additional credit, property, or
service from such bank other than a loan, discount, deposit, or trust
service;
(B) that the customer shall obtain some additional credit, property, or
service from a bank holding company of such bank, or from any other
subsidiary of such bank holding company;
(C) that the customer provide some additional credit, property, or
service to such bank, other than those related to and usually provided in
connection with a loan, discount, deposit, or trust service;
(D) that the customer provide some additional credit, property, or
service to a bank holding company of such bank, or to any other
subsidiary of such bank holding company; or
(E) that the customer shall not obtain some other credit, property, or
service from a competitor of such bank, a bank holding company, of
such bank, or any subsidiary of such bank holding company, other than
a condition or requirement that such bank shall reasonably impose in a
credit transaction to assure the soundness of the credit.
The Board may by regulation or order permit such exceptions to the
foregoing prohibition as it considers will not be contrary to the purposes of
this section.
(2)(A) No bank which maintains a correspondent account in the name of
another bank shall make an extension of credit to an executive officer or
director of, or to any person who directly or indirectly or acting through
or in concert with one or more persons owns, controls, or has the power
to vote more than 10 per centum of any class of voting securities of,
such other bank or to any related interest of such person unless such
extension of credit is made on substantially the same terms, including
interest rates and collateral as those prevailing at the time for comparable transactions with other persons and does not involve more than the
normal risk of repayment or present other unfavorable features.
463
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(B) No bank shall open a correspondent account at another bank while
such bank has outstanding an extension of credit to an executive officer
or director of, or other person who directly or indirectly or acting
through or in concert with one or more persons owns, controls, or has
the power to vote more than 10 per centum of any class of voting
securities of, the bank desiring to open the account or to any related
interest of such person, unless such extension of credit was made on
substantially the same terms, including interest rates and collateral as
those prevailing at the time for comparable transactions with other
persons and does not involve more than the normal risk of repayment or
present other unfavorable features.
(C) No bank which maintains a correspondent account at another bank
shall make an extension of credit to an executive officer or director of,
or to any person who directly or indirectly acting through or in concert
with one or more persons owns, controls, or has the power to vote more
than 10 per centum of any class of voting securities of, such other bank
or to any related interest of such person, unless such extension of credit
is made on substantially the same terms, including interest rates and
collateral as those prevailing at the time for comparable transactions
with other persons and does not involve more than the normal risk of
repayment or present other unfavorable features.
(D) No bank which has outstanding an extension of credit to an
executive officer or director of, or to any person who directly or
indirectly or acting through or in concert with one or more persons
owns, controls, or has the power to vote more than 10 per centum of
any class of voting securities of, another bank or to any related interest
of such person shall open a correspondent account at such other bank,
unless such extension of credit was made on substantially the same
terms, including interest rates and collateral as those prevailing at the
time for comparable transactions with other persons and does not
involve more than the normal risk of repayment or present other
unfavorable features.
(E) For purposes of this paragraph, the term "extension of credit" shall
have the meaning prescribed by the Board pursuant to section 22(h) of
the Federal Reserve Act (12 U.S.C. 375b) [12 USCS § 375b], and the
term "executive officer" shall have the same meaning given it under
section 22(g) of the Federal Reserve Act [12 USCS § 375a].
(F)(i) Any bank which violates or any officer, director, employee, agent,
or other person participating in the conduct of the affairs of such
bank who violates any provision of section 106(b)(2) [para. (2) of this
section] shall forfeit and pay a civil penalty of not more than $1,000
per day for each day during which such violation continues: Provided,
That the agency having authority to impose a civil money penalty
may, in its discretion, compromise, modify, or remit any civil money
penalty which is subject to imposition or has been imposed under
such authority. The penalty may be assessed and collected by the
464
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Comptroller of the Currency in the case of a national bank, the Board
in the case of a State member bank, or the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation in the case of an insured nonmember State bank, by
written notice. As used in this section, the term "violates" includes
without any limitation any action (alone or with another or others)
for or toward causing, bringing about, participating in, counselling, or
aiding or abetting a violation.
(ii) In determining the amount of the penalty the Comptroller of the
Currency, the Board or the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation,
as the case may be, shall take into account the appropriateness of the
penalty with respect to the size of the financial resources and good
faith of the bank or person charged, the gravity of the violation, the
history of previous violations, and such other matters as justice may
require.
(iii) The bank or person assessed shall be afforded an opportunity for
agency hearing, upon request made within ten days after issuance of
the notice of assessment. In such hearing, all issues shall be determined on the record pursuant to section 554 of title 5, United States
Code [5 USCS § 554]. The agency determination shall be made by
final order which may be reviewed only as provided in subsection (iv).
If no hearing is requested as herein provided, the assessment shall
constitute a final and unappealable order.
(iv) Any bank or person against whom an order imposing a civil
money penalty has been entered after agency hearing under this
section may obtain review by the United States court of appeals for
the circuit in which the home office of the bank is located, or the
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit,
by filing a notice of appeal in such court within twenty days from the
service of such order, and simultaneously sending a copy of such
notice by registered or certified mail to the Comptroller of the
Currency, the Board or the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation,
as the case may be. The Comptroller of the Currency, the Board or
the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, as the case may be, shall
promptly certify and file in such court the record upon which the
penalty was imposed, as provided in section 2112 of title 28, Ur" ed
States Code [28 USCS § 2112]. The findings of the Comptroller o * the
Currency, the Board or the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation,
as the case may be, shall be set aside if found to be unsupported by
substantial evidence as provided by section 706(2)(E) of title 5, United
States Code [5 USCS § 706(2)(E)j.
(v) If any bank or person fails to pay an assessment after it has
become a final and unappealable order, or after the court of appeals
has entered final judgment in favor of the agency, the Comptroller of
the Currency, the Board or the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, as the case may be, shall refer the matter to the Attorney
General, who shall recover the amount assessed by action in the
465
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appropriate United States district court. In such action the validity
and apropriateness of the final order imposing the penalty shall not be
subject to review.
(vi) The Comptroller of the Currency, the Board and the Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation shall promulgate regulations establishing procedures necessary to implement this section,
(vii) All penalties collected under authority of this section shall be
covered into the Treasury of the United States.
(G)(i) Each executive officer and each stockholder of record who
directly or indirectly owns, controls, or has the power to vote more
than 10 per centum of any class of voting securities of an insured
bank shall make a written report to the board of directors of such
bank for any year during which such executive officer or shareholder
has outstanding an extension of credit from a bank which maintains a
corresponding account in the name of such bank. Such report shall
include the following information:
(1) the maximum amount of indebtedness to the bank maintaining
the correspondent account during such year of (a) such executive
officer or stockholder of record, (b) each company controlled by
such executive officer or stockholder, or (c) each political or
campaign committee the funds or services of which will benefit
such executive officer or stockholder, or which is controlled by
such executive officer or stockholder;
(2) the amount of indebtedness to the bank maintaining the
correspondent account outstanding as of a date not more than ten
days prior to the date of filing of such report of (a) such executive
officer or stockholder of record, (b) each company controlled by
such executive officer or stockholder, or (c) each political or
campaign committee the funds or services of which will benefit
such executive officer or stockholder;
(3) the range of interest rates charged on such indebtedness of such
executive officer or stockholder of record; and
(4) the terms and conditions of such indebtedness of such executive
officer or stockholder of record.
(ii) The appropriate Federal banking agencies are authorized to issue
rules and regulations, including definitions of terms, to require the
reporting and public disclosure of information by any bank or
executive officer or principal shareholder thereof concerning any
extension of credit by a correspondent bank to the reporting bank's
executive officers or principal shareholders, or the related interests of
such persons.
(H) For the purpose of this paragraph—
(i) the term "bank" includes a mutual savings bank;
(ii) the term "related interests of such persons" includes any company
controlled by such executive officer, director, or person, or any
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political or campaign committee the funds or services of which will
benefit such executive officer, director, or person or which is controlled by such executive officer, director, or person; and
(iii) the terms "control of a company" and "company" have the same
meaning as under section 22(h) of the Federal Reserve Act (12 U.S.C.
375b) [12 USCS § 375b].
(Dec. 31, 1970, P. L. 91-607, Title I, § 106(b), 84 Stat. 1766; Nov. 10,
1978, P. L. 95-630, Title VIII, § 801, 92 Stat. 3690; Oct. 15, 1982, P. L
97-320, Title IV, Part A, § 410(f), Part B, §§ 424(c) in part, (d)(ll), (e) in
part, 428, 96 Stat. 1520, 1523, 1526.)
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References in text:
"This section", referred to in this section, is section 106 of Act Dec.
31, 1970, P. L. 91-607, Title I, 84 Stat. 1766, which appears as 12
USCS §§ 1971 et seq.
Amendments:
1978. Act Nov. 10, 1978 (effective 120 days after enactment on 11/10/
78, as provided by §2101 of such Act, which appears as 12 USCS
§ 375b) designated existing provisions as para. (1), in para. (1) as so
designated, redesignated former paras. (l)-{5) as subparas. (A)-(E),
respectively, and added para. (2).
1982. Act Oct. 15, 1982, in para. (2), in subparas. (A), (B), (C), and
(D), inserted "or to any related interest of such person", in subpara.
(E), substituted "the meaning prescribed by the Board pursuant to
section 22(h) of the Federal Reserve Act (12 (U.S.C. 375b)," for "the
same meaning given it in section 23A of the Federal Reserve Act", in
subpara. (F), in cl. (i), inserted ": Provided, That the agency having
authority to impose a civil money penalty may, in its discretion,
compromise, modify, or remit any civil money penalty which is subject
to imposition or has been imposed under such authority" and substituted "may" for "shall" following "The penalty", and in cl. (iv),
substituted "twenty days from the service" for "ten days from the
date", in subpara. (G), substituted cl. (ii) for one which read: "Each
insured bank shall compile the reports filed pursuant to subparagraph
(G)(i) and forward such compilation to the Comptroller of the Currency in the case of a national bank, the Board in the case of a State
member bank, and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation in the
case of an insured nonmember State bank." and deleted cl. (iii) which
read: "Each insured bank shall include in the report required to be
made under subsection (k)(l) of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act (12
U.S.C. 1817(k)(l)) a list by name of each executive officer or stockholder of record who directly or indirectly owns, controls, or has the
power to vote more than 10 per centum of any class of voting securities
of the bank who files information required by subparagraph (G)(i) and
the aggregate amount of all extensions of credit by correspondent banks
to such executive officers or stockholders of record, any company
controlled by such executive officers or stockholders, and any political
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